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Abstract
In single administrative domain networks there is only one security policy
which can be evaluated by the IT security manager thanks, to monitoring and
reporting tools. Grid networks are often composed of different administrative
domains owned by different organizations dispersed globally. Such networks
are referred to as multi-administrative domain networks. Each domain might
have its own security policy and may not want to share its security data with
less-protected networks, making it more complex to ensure the security of
such networks and protecting them from cross-domain attacks. We propose
a Security Event Manager (SEM) called Grid Security Operation Center
(GSOC), which facilitate IT security managers in giving a view of the security
of the whole grid network without compromising confidentiality of security
data. To do so, GSOC provides a security evaluation of each administrative
domain (AD) and a parametric security alerts-sharing scheme. Alert sharing
can then be tuned in order to meet local security policy rules.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. General Security Problems in Computer Networks
In traditional computer networks, it is not recommended to send unen-
crypted passwords over the network as they can be easily sniffed out by the
adversaries. If manually set passwords are weak then there exists many tools
that could allow to break them [1, 2, 3]. However usage of manually set pass-
word do not preclude the use of strong passwords that would not be easily
breakable. The asymmetric-based authentication system is made vulnera-
ble if the attackers use denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on the servers which
maintains the certificates and the public/private keys. Most of the time the
entire network is compromised from the users that use very simple passwords.
Sometimes by the weird security administration that allows the attackers to
gain access in the organizations network. The attackers also exploits the vul-
nerabilities that exist in the applications running in the network [4]. When
one or multiple nodes are compromised in a single administrative domain
network, it is easy to take quick actions on the hosts and network of the
organization to identify the source of the problem. Once the source is iden-
tified, new policies and restrictions can be placed within the organization’s
network to block future threats.
1.2. Specific Security Problems in Grid Computing
For attackers, grid services are very interesting targets to violate quality
of service (QoS) by launching DoS and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks. Section 6.4 of the RFC 3820 [5] mentions there are possibilities for
launching DoS attacks on the machines that are responsible for generating
key pairs and when granting dynamic delegations using proxy certificates. By
the growth of web service and XML technologies in grid computing networks,
the application level firewalls are unable to detect sophisticated attacks fab-
ricated using content of the messages [6]. VPNs also struggle to provide
end-to-end security as they protect layer 2 or layer 3. When a node in the
grid computing gets compromised it is very hard to identify the source of
the problem because there are multiple nodes from different administrative
domains collaborating with each other. In such cases there is always a high
2
possibility that attacks could be propagated to other organization’s network
which are the part of that grid network.
1.3. Proposed Suggestions for Improving the Security of Grid Computing
Keep in mind that 100 percent security is an unrealistic objective [7].
To maintain the security up to maximum, grid computing networks possess
Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [8] and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
[9] that uses certificates for validating the legitimate users into the network.
However, in [10] Cody et al. envision future research in grid computing
will focus on high performance vs high security in grid computing networks
because data encryption is inversely proportional to performance. In [11],
Schwiegelshohn et al. quoted the example of the XtreemOS [12] project
which is using native Linux system-level support for authentication mecha-
nisms (such as PAM, Kerberos and SQL based authentication) instead of a
specific middleware based authentication. Their aim is to reduce the com-
plexity of the middleware. They therefore propose security authentication to
be shifted to operating systems. Propagation of cross-domain attacks can be
blocked if the security information can be shared among the members of the
grid computing network [13].
Despite all precautions and propositions, chances still exist that adver-
saries can target the victim whenever they receive the opportunity. There-
fore, there is a high need to have a security monitoring system in place that
works in parallel with other security components. It must be scalable and
fault-tolerant. It must handle sophisticated network attacks launched using
the power of grid networks, must can block cross-domain attacks, must re-
port security breaches in real time, and must share them with other members
of the grid computing network. This paper proposes a grid security opera-
tion center dedicated for the grid computing networks. The reminder of this
paper consists of five sections: a discussion of related work in section 2, an
explanation of GSOC design in section 3, a proposition of security evalua-
tion in section 4, a presentation of experiments and results in section 5, and
concludes with a proposition of future work in section 7.
2. RELATED WORK
Figure 1 shows the classification of different types of monitoring and secu-
rity management tools. Kenny and Coghlan [14] proposed SANTA-G (Grid-
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Figure 1: Classification of tools which monitor grid computing networks and security
management tools for traditional and grid computing networks.
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Enabled System Networks Trace Analysis) which is based on the RGMA
(Relational Grid Monitoring Architecture), is an implementation of GMA
which is developed under the European DataGrid (EDG). SANTA-G uses
Snort [15] for monitoring network traffic and is composed of three compo-
nents: Sensors that need to be installed on the monitored devices, a Query
Engine, and a GUI. Snort logs suspicious activities that occur in the net-
work. These logs are then forwarded to a SANTA-G sensor which analyzes
them and looks for attacks. If a new attack is found, the corresponding log
will be sent to the query engine and saved in the database. The query engine
publishes the detected attack to its users. The SANTA-G model lacks inci-
dent detection, a tracking and response platform, and analysis of reported
events to check the patterns for distributed attacks meaning it can not prop-
erly detect distributed-denial-of-service-attacks (DDoS). The RGMA has the
main database which holds the reported attacks by one or more SANTA-Gs
which are running in a grid network. Due to this design limitation, if the
size of the network grows rapidly then multiple SANTA-G’s begin sending
alerts simultaneously making it difficult to hold the alert information for long
periods of time. It can, therefore, only correlate reported attacks for a short
period of time. This lower its detection capacity for attacks or scans that are
using slow-timed pace. SANTA-G only uses Snort as a source of data, giving
a restricted view of the network security. SANTA-G does not have a security
alert-sharing mechanism and cannot detecting cross-domain attacks.
Fang-Yie Leu et al. proposes three versions of an intrusion detection sys-
tem dedicated to grid networks: GIDS (Grid Intrusion Detection System),
PGIDS (Performance GIDS), and FGIDS (Fault-tolerant GIDS) [16, 17, 18].
All variations of GIDS consist of four types of components: dispatchers,
which assign network traffic to Detection Nodes (DN) for detecting attacks;
a scheduler to balance the load between dispatchers; DN which use Intru-
sion Detection System Module (IDSM) for packet analysis and for detecting
attacks; and a Block List Database (BLD) to hold intrusion information
and suspected IP addresses. The objective of GIDS is to detect logical, mo-
mentary and chronic attacks. GIDS attack detection accuracy is not very
accurate as it does not matches the patterns of similar attacks that occurred
in the past by the same attacker. The scope for attack detection is very small
[16] since they used TCP, UDP and ICMP flood attacks. To overcome these
issues they proposes PGIDS, the objective of PGIDS is to add DoS/DDoS
attack detection to GIDS, but PGIDS suffers from DN failure under mas-
sive DDoS attacks. A new version, called FGIDS, tackles this problem. The
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Table 1: Comparison of Different Grid Security Management Solutions
GSS DoS DDoS BF SAS SE Cor CDA SC FT Comments
GSOC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Fully Suitable
OSSIM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Suitable
Prelude [19] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Suitable
DSOC Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Partially Suitable
Snort Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Partially Suitable
R-GMA Yes No Yes No No No No No No Not Suitable
GIDS Yes Yes No No No No No No No Not Suitable
PGIDS Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No Not Suitable
FGIDS Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Partially Suitable
LDIDS Yes ? ? Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Not Suitable
DIDSoG Yes No ? Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Partially Suitable
GSS=Grid Security Solution, DoS=Denial of Service Attacks, DDoS=Distributed Denial of Service
Attacks, BF=Brute Force Attacks, CDA=Cross-Domain Attacks, SAS=Security Alert Sharing,
SE=Security Evaluation, Cor=Correlation, CDA=Cross-Domain Attacks, SC=Scalability, FT=Fault
Tolerance, ? = Not known.
FGIDS has introduced a new module called Backup Broker to help the sched-
uler assign another DN to a dispatcher if a massive attacks occurs. FGIDS
collects events from multiple sites of an administrative domain, but without
having any correlation method for security alerts, it could be vulnerable to
DDoS attacks that use grid computing power. Distributed attacks can be
detected in one administrative domain but they cannot be detected if they
target devices that are located in different administrative domains. More
generally, cross-domain attacks cannot be detected by the different versions
of GIDS.
The architecture of Large-Scale Distributed Intrusion Detection
System (LDIDS) proposed by Yonggang et al. [20] is a scalable and fault-
tolerant solution. The LDIDS can be applied in grid computing networks due
to its modular nature but lacks in the efficiency of the inter communication
of its security components. Furthermore, in [20] no details are given about
the types of attacks that are detectable by LDIDS.
The Distributed Intrusion Detection System on Grid (DIDoS)
proposed by Poula Silva et al. [21] is a hierarchy of multiple intrusion detec-
tion systems. The experiments are performed using a grid simulator called
Gridsim which can only model and validate the collaboration between the
different components of DIDos but not real grid environment conditions. DI-
6
DoS does not provides a mechanism for sharing alerts between the different
administrative domains.
Distributed Security Operation Center (DSOC) proposed by Ganame
et al. [22] does not have an intelligent security alert-sharing mechanism be-
tween different administrative domains either. Therefore, it cannot detect
cross-domain attacks.
Table 1 summarizes the main features of any security management system
that handles the security of the grid computing networks. It shows the
shortcomings of the security systems that are discussed in this section. In
this paper we will discuss GSOC (Grid Security Operation Center) which
can overcome the limitations of the discussed solutions.
3. GSOC DESIGN
The GSOC modular design is based on [23][24]. GSOC is composed
of seven components namely Event Generating Box (EBox), Logs Collecting
Box (CBox), Local Analyzer (LA(DBox+ABox)), Global Intrusion Database
(GIDB), Global Analyzer (GA), Remote Logs Collecting Box (RCBox), and
Secure Virtual Organization Box (SVOBox). Figure 5 is a general overview
of GSOC architecture and shows the main components of GSOC and their
position within the grid network. These components, except SVOBox, are
discussed in detail in [13, 25]. In this paper only the short description of
these components will be presented.
3.1. Security Alert Generating Mechanism
EBoxes (see figure 2) are the source of data for GSOC and cover a wide
range of devices, from a normal computer to any device in the grid comput-
ing network. The nice feature is no additional software is required to
be installed on the EBoxes in order to send logs. GSOC uses only
standard logging systems and transport protocol. To integrate a new EBox
in GSOC, a simple configuration has to be made like a log redirection. One
CBox collects data from multiple EBoxes using standard transport protocols.
The logs are processed depending on their protocol and then forwarded to
the dispatcher which sends them the to the proper application agent. The
application agents extract the information from the logs and create format-
ted events which are sent to the basic correlation module. One application
agent is required for each type of log collected. CBoxes operate at each lo-
cal site of an Administrative Domain (AD). One CBox is sufficient for one
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Figure 2: Intercommunication view of EBox, CBox and Local Analyzer
local site, but more than one CBox can be added depending on the number
of active sensors and the amount of logs they generate. The Basic Correla-
tion (BC) module has a defined time limit which holds the reported security
alerts for one minute and correlates for detecting attacks. The Basic Cor-
relation module forwards the correlated attack information to the Advanced
Correlation (AC) module for detecting distributed attacks. The advanced
correlation module collects logs from multiple CBoxes and further correlates
for more sophisticated and distributed attacks. If an attack is detected, the
ABox reports it to the administrator in real time and saves the security alert
permanently in Local Intrusion Database (LIDB). The same reported alert
will also be saved in the Global Intrusion Database (GIDB) as a backup of
LIDB (see figure 4). LIDB is a database that contains all the core configura-
tions related to the network devices, user configurations, security rules, and
vulnerability database from Common Vulnerabilities Exposures (CVE) [26].
The mechanism for detecting distributed attacks using basic and advance
correlation is discussed in detail in [25].
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Figure 3: SVOBox Main Dashboard
3.2. GSOC Architecture Internal View
Figure 4 is the architectural internal view of each component of the
GSOC. The reported alerts saved in the LIDB are also forwarded to the
GIDB for security evaluation and to be shared with other ADs that com-
pose the grid computing network. The GIDB consists of two parts. The
upper part contains a replica of all configurations done within the LAs, re-
ported security alerts from all the local sites of the AD and messages from
all RCBoxes. The RCBoxes work like CBoxes except RCBoxes collect logs
from the most important sensors in the AD. These sensors could be general
security devices, proprietary softwares or customizable network monitoring
systems. The purpose of collecting these logs is to double check the logs
for network attacks. RCBoxes have been introduced in the GSOC design
(i) to detect attacks that target security management devices (ii) when the
attacker camouflages its attacks and (iii) when the attackers target GSOC
components. The RCBoxes receive copies of the logs from the sensors and
forward them to the GA. The GA correlates the received logs and forwards
them to the GIDB. Thus, RCBox provides a way to compare the deviation
(∆) in the logs generated during normal operation of the network with the
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Figure 4: GSOC Internal Architectural View
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abnormal behavior using GIDB. The deviation is calculated by comparing the
message received in the GIDB from all local sites and the messages received
from all RCBoxes. The deviation is directly proportional to the possibility
of attacks.
Figure 3 shows the deviation (∆), the messages received by the RCBoxes,
the messages received from local sites, a short report, a detailed report, the
security alert sharing option, and a security evaluation of two ADs. At the
final stage the SVOBox evaluates the security level value for each AD. Secu-
rity evaluation is discussed in detail in section 4.
The lower part of GIDB is called External GIDB and is responsible
for sharing the reported security alerts with other ADs in a grid computing
network. Security alert sharing can be very effective in blocking cross-domain
attacks while keeping in view the composition of grid computing network
which includes:
(i) Different ADs that consist of multi-local sites combined together to
form a network.
(ii) The size of the network increases and decreases dynamically.
(iii) Nodes from one AD can collaborate with nodes from other ADs where
different security policies are applied.
(iv) Both the administrator of the ADs whose nodes are communicating with
each other do not know the nature of the attacks that are in progress
at either side.
This raises the need for a solution that would provide the network admin-
istrators functionalities that can inform them of the nature of attacks that
are under progress in any external ADs. One solution to this problem is to
provide a way to share, between different ADs, their security alerts. But,
sharing all security alerts of one entire network with another administrative
is something that security policy should forbid. To address this issue GSOC
provides a mechanism by which the network administrator of an AD can
share specific security alerts with selected ADs depending on their security
level of either low, medium, and high which rank the confidentiality of the
alerts. The details of each category is discussed in detail in section 4. Fig-
ure 6 shows the overview of the reported security alert sharing mechanism
between six administrative domains.
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Figure 5: GSOC General Overview
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SVOBox assigns security level values by manipulating the number of se-
curity alerts generated within the local sites of the AD. All the security alerts
generated in different ADs of a grid network can be seen at the SVOBox main
dashboard. The SVOBox dashboard access is granted to the network admin-
istrator of each AD. Only the ADs who are sharing their resources with each
other are allowed to send and receive the security alerts between them (figure
3).
4. SECURITY EVALUATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE DOMAINS
Security evaluation of administrative domains that form a grid computing
network is required in order to create trust between ADs. Security levels
are a representation of the current security state of the AD. Evaluating the
security of an AD which can be a multi-sites network is a complex task as
it includes many heterogeneous devices. Security can be evaluated using
multiple metrics. Some possibilities are:
(i) The skills of the IT security team that includes experience, certifica-
tions, trainings, and their availability.
(ii) The security devices and softwares used including (i.e., firewalls, intru-
sion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) and anti-virus softwares).
Their configuration level includes the security rules and policies that
must be updated on time.
(iii) Security contingency plans in case of severe attacks.
(iv) Time required to restore all the systems and services after shutdown in
case of disasters.
(v) User awareness programs, for maintaining their system’s security.
(vi) Reports of deep vulnerability scans, security scans, and pen tests must
also be considered.
All the above mentioned aspects needs to be evaluated by a third party for
non-biased evaluation results. We aim to provide an automated security
evaluation of a dynamic network at a given time whereas security standard
like ISO 27000 works on a progressive view of the security. we are using an
automated security evaluation which takes into account dynamic network and
its real-time constraints [27]. For evaluating security level values in GSOC,
some equations written below have been applied to any AD which is a part
13
Figure 6: GSOC Security Alert Sharing Mechanism
of the grid computing network. These equations help GSOC to categorize
the ADs by processing the number of low, medium and high alerts generated
within their local sites. These levels are criticality levels that are assigned by
to each alert by the network administrator of each AD. GSOC categorizes
the ADs according to three security levels. Security level one is the highest
security level while three is the lowest one (see figure 6).
Security evaluation of a network can also be done using tools like Nessus
[28], OpenVAS [29] or Saint [30]. In GSOC the result of these three tools
are also incorporated to give a better view to the administrator. Table 2
shows the number of security alerts detected during scan on 10 computers.
The configuration of the computers are CPU 2.4 GHz and RAM 512 MB.
Vulnerabilities are present in any software and they are reported at regular
basis. There is a high possibility that many vulnerabilities can be reported
if a machine contains lots of non-updated softwares. In our experiments, we
used multiple machines with older and new release of updates.
LAV (Low Alert Value) is the number of low level alerts reported which
are, for example, information like session opening, session closing, or services
start/stop/restart. MAV (Medium Alert Value) is the number of medium
14
Table 2: Security Evaluation Comparison of 10 Machines
OpenVas Nessus Saint
M # LA MA HA LA MA HA LA MA HA
M1 10 1 1 27 4 0 8 2 3
M2 10 1 1 27 4 0 11 2 0
M3 10 1 1 27 4 0 7 2 2
M4 28 4 1 96 16 0 14 2 3
M5 10 1 0 21 3 0 7 3 3
M6 10 1 1 26 4 0 8 2 1
M7 10 1 1 27 4 0 8 2 1
M8 10 1 1 26 4 0 8 2 0
M9 10 1 1 27 4 0 8 2 2
M10 7 1 0 30 2 0 7 1 1
Total 115 13 8 334 49 0 86 20 16
LA=Low Alerts, MA=Medium Alerts, HA=High Alerts, M#=Machine Number
alerts reported, and HAV (High Alert Value) is the number of high alerts
reported in any AD. The behavior of the AD can be categorized according
to three case :
Case-I: When an AD operates under normal circumstances, LAV is always
greater than MAV, which is greater than HAV (LAV > MAV > HAV ).
Case-II: There is a slight change in the normal behavior of an AD or in
any one of its local sites. This happens when the inexperienced attackers try
to launch basic attacks. Some examples might be, manual use of incorrect
password attempts, port scans, and ICMP flooding. They use their personal
machines without IP spoofing for launching these attacks, making these at-
tacks easily detectable.
Case-III: There is a major change in the normal behavior of an AD or in any
one of its local sites. This case occurs when the experienced attackers use
multiple machines for launching distributed attacks. They use automated
tools and spoof their IPs. The duration of the attacks last for a very long pe-
riod of time and they mix their attacks with normal behavior to camouflage
their operations. These attacks are difficult to detect and very destructive
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in nature. Some of the examples of these attacks are the use of brute force
attacks using automated tools such as THC Hydra [2] & Guess Who [3], DoS
& DDoS attacks using Slowloris [31], and UDP & TCP flooding by changing
the maximum transmission unit (MTU) of the packets.
NOTE: The standard policy must be adopted by all members of the grid
computing network for assigning the critical values to the attacks in order to
have a homogeneous reporting systems.
Formalization of Security Evaluation
LA = Low Alerts. MA = Medium Alerts. HA = High Alerts. LAV = Low
Alerts Value. MAV = Medium Alert Value. HAV = High Alert Value. SL
= Security Level. GN = Grid Network. LS = Local Site. LSA = Local Sites
Alerts. t = time at which the alerts detected. L = Low, M = Medium and
H = High.
Let GN be a grid computing network:
GN = {AD1, AD2, ............ADm}
with
AD(i) = {LS(i)1, LS(i)2, .............LS(i)ni}
where ni is the number of local sites of the administrative domain, and m is
the number of administrative domains in GN. Now LAV, MAV and HAV at
time “t” can be determined by:
LAV 7−→ LA(ADi)(t) =
ni∑
j=1
LSAL(t)
LAV is the number of total low alerts reported within all local sites of an AD.
MAV 7−→MA(ADi)(t) =
ni∑
j=1
LSAM(t)
MAV is the number of total low alerts reported within all local sites of an AD.
HAV 7−→ HA(ADi)(t) =
ni∑
j=1
LSAH(t)
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HAV is the number of total low alerts reported within all local sites of an AD.
Now the AD can be set to SL1, SL2 or SL3, if any of the equations from 1
to 6 matches with the LAV, MAV, and HAV conditions.
Equation 1 shows that the AD has medium security alerts greater than low
and high, whereas low security alerts; are greater than high security alerts,
therefore it should be placed in SL2 (see graph).
(LAV(AD) < MAV(AD) and LAV(AD) > HAV(AD)) then SL = 2 (1)
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Equation 2 shows that the AD has high security alerts greater than low
and medium, whereas low security alerts are greater than medium security
alerts; therefore it should be placed in SL3 (see graph).
elseif(LAV(AD) > MAV(AD) and LAV(AD) < HAV(AD)) then SL = 3 (2)
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Equation 3 shows that the AD has low security alerts greater than high
and medium, whereas medium security alerts are greater than high security
alerts; therefore it should be placed in SL1 (see graph).
elseif(LAV(AD) > MAV(AD) and MAV(AD) > HAV(AD)) then SL = 1 (3)
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Equation 4 shows that the AD has low security alerts greater than high
and medium, whereas high security alerts are greater than medium security
alerts; therefore it should be placed in SL2 (see graph).
elseif(MAV(AD) < LAV(AD) and HAV(AD) < LAV(AD)) then SL = 2 (4)
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Equation 5 shows that the AD has high security alerts greater than low
and medium, whereas medium security alerts are greater than low security
alerts; therefore it should be placed in SL3 (see graph).
elseif(MAV(AD) > LAV(AD) and MAV(AD) < HAV(AD)) then SL = 3 (5)
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Equation 6 shows that the AD has medium security alerts greater than
low and high, whereas high security alerts are greater than low security alerts;
therefore it should be placed in SL3 (see graph).
elseif(MAV(AD) > LAV(AD) and MAV(AD) > HAV(AD)) then SL = 3 (6)
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Figure 7: Security Alert Statistics of 10 Machines using Nessus, OpenVAS and Saint
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Figure 7 is the graphical representation of the data of 10 machines that
shows that in normal circumstances the low alerts are always greater than
medium and high alerts. These results are taken by the scan from Nessus,
OpenVAS and Saint, and validate the equations used for security evaluation
in GSOC.
5. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
This section compares the behavior of two types of security management
systems. The first one is developed for traditional computer network, but
could be deployed in grid computing networks; the second one is developed
for grid computing networks. The Distributed Security Operation Center
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Figure 8: Detection rate of BF, DoS and DDoS in Distributed Security Operation Center
(DSOC)
(DSOC), which while developed for traditional computer networks has been
used for executing different tests is classified in figure 1 under the category
“Security solutions for traditional networks deployable in grid computing
networks.” The DSOC will be used for representing other security solutions
that exist in a similar category. Graphs 8 and 9 show the security alert rate
in minutes. The graphs shows three attack details, namely those of Brute
Force attacks (BF), Denial of Service attacks (DoS), and Distributed Denial
of Service attacks (DDoS) launched on DSOC and on GSOC using multiple
sites of the Grid’5000 (G5K) network. The details of the network can be
seen at [32].
5.1. Attack Scenario-I
Figure 10 consists of two parts. The upper part represents a simplified
view of G5K network with CBox running at the Rennes site. The LA+ABox,
LIDB, GA+GIDB are running at the Nancy site. The approved users are
allowed access to these sites where they can reserve many nodes and perform
their experiments. These users are also allowed to reserve any number of
machines between nine other sites of the G5K.
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Figure 9: Detection rate of BF, DoS and DDoS in Grid Security Operation Center (GSOC)
The lower part is a simplified view of our lab network where two users
from Machine 1 and 2 via ssh connection 1© & 2© are allowed to connect into
the G5K network. Attackers 1 & 2 try to get access to machines 1 and 2 by
launching brute force attacks using a dictionary of passwords that contains
8048 passwords. Attacker 2 was not successful on Machine 1 due to a strong
password. Attacker 1 was successful and cracked the password of Machine 2
after 10 minutes which is found at the 5000th location of the password file 3©.
Attacker 1 using machine 2 is a threat within local and external networks
which are connected together. Attacker 1 can perform malicious activities in
G5K since the connection originated from the approved user machine. For
the G5K network, Machine 1 was a trusted machine but is now compromised;
4© shows that the G5K network is accessible by Attacker 1. Attacker 1 can
further launch more brute force attacks on other machines of the G5K. If
successful, the results are very destructive.
5.2. Attack Scenario-II
Usually, an experienced attacker uses a combination of multiple attacks to
hide their activities. The easiest scenario is to first launch a DoS attack from
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Figure 10: Stopping propagation of cross-domain attacks between our lab and G5K net-
work
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Attacker 3 that generates the alerts of DoS 5©. These alerts are generated
deliberately to attract the attention of the network administrator and fill the
GUI of the security management system. After some time Attacker 2 from
the other machine starts launching another attempt of brute force attacks 6©
to crack the password of Machine 1. These attacks last for short periods of
time and are restarted after some time.
5.3. Attack Scenario-III
A more complex scenario is to launch the DDoS from multiple machines
(Attacker 4 to Attacker 6) by spoofing IP addresses 7© & 8©. These attackers
generate several alerts and because of the IP spoofing need more time from
the administrator to detect the actual source of the attacks. These attacks
cover two objectives: It overloads the network and its components so the
legitimate users cannot access it and allows them to destabilize the security
management systems. In this way, the malicious activities are not easily
detectable and if they are detected, they will be reported very late to the
administrator due to the high number of security alerts processing time.
By deploying GSOC between G5K and our lab network, attack types I, II
& III can be blocked at very early stage. The CBox which is running in our
network collects all unsuccessful authentication failures attempts and sends
them to the LA 9©. The LA correlates all the logs, generates a brute force
attack attempts, and saves it in LIDB. The sharing mechanism of GSOC
allows the lab network to share this information with the G5K network. The
administrator of the G5K network has access to the brute force attempt
alarm in our lab which includes the IP address, user ID, start time of attack,
end time of attack, and total number of fail attempts 10 . This information
helps the network administrator of G5K to stop the access of that user. In
this way an attack which is propagated from one administrative domain to
another can be blocked.
In figure 8 the DSOC detects the attacks between 1 or 2 minutes and
reports them at the dashboard. The DSOC generates an alarm for almost
every attempt. These alarms utilize network bandwidth in case of a multi-
site network, and they use a reasonable amount of disk space if the attacks
continue for long periods of time. The reported security alarms are only
available within the premises of one AD. This limitation does not suit grid
networks as there are attacks that use computer worms which expands by
themselves. These attacks could therefore expand to other members of a
grid network. A mechanism has therefore been adopted in GSOC for sharing
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Figure 11: No Mechanism for Security Alert Sharing in Grid Computing Network Scenario
reported security alerts between multiple ADs to protect other members in a
grid network for possible cross-domain attacks. See figure 11 where there is no
security alert sharing mechanism. This scenario can lead to propagate some
serious network attacks to other members of the grid. In figure 12 the security
mechanism exists but it is not intelligent because ADs are sharing security
alerts randomly. This sharing of information cannot be result oriented as it
uses more network bandwidth and exposes internal security information to
insecure ADs. Keeping these issues in mind, an efficient approach is to share
the security alerts after classifying the ADs. See figure 6 for a depiction of
security evaluation through the assignment of sharing mechanisms into three
categories SL1 as most secure, SL2 as more secure, and SL3 as least secure.
This classification gives a global view of security within a grid network to its
members.
In figure 9 the GSOC detects the attack within one minute on the CBox.
By the second minute they are detected on the ABox, which correlates the
alerts coming from multiple local sites and discards false positives. By the
third minute the details of the attacks are available on the SVOBox. By
the fourth minute all alerts are ready for sharing with other ADs in a grid
computing network. This can help blocking cross-domain attacks. It utilizes
less bandwidth and disk space and gives a global view of security for the
entire grid network.
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Figure 12: Unintelligent Mechanism for Security Alert Sharing in Grid Computing Network
Scenario
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Figure 13: Stability of different Security Management Systems
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6. DISCUSSION
Due to the nature of grid computing networks, a security management
system must comply to some basic factors. According to our research the
most important are scalability, fault-tolerance, security alerts correlation, se-
curity evaluation, and security alert sharing. GSOC covers all these factors
as it has scalability due to its modular design. It can handle networks that
are growing dynamically. RCBox provides fault-tolerance capability in case
if any of the CBox fails or comes under attack. GSOC has two step corre-
lation basic and advance which help to keep it stable especially when the
grid network is under DDoS attacks. GSOC has dynamic and static security
evaluation which informs the member of the grid about the members that are
vulnerable to the attacks. This helps to share their resources with them by
applying more strict security policies. SVOBox provides security alerts shar-
ing mechanism which is the most important factor in blocking cross-domain
attacks. OSSIM and GSOC are suitable to be deployed in grid computing
network to manage its security as shown in Table 1. Subsection 6.1 shows a
small test about the performance of these systems. OSSIM [33] is a product
of Alien Vault Professional Corporation. It is an open source freely available
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system but some ad-
vance reporting capabilities are not freely available. It is a framework for the
management of the security infrastructure of the large organizations.
6.1. Stability Comparison of Security Management Systems
Figure 13 is the graphical view which shows the comparison of different
security management systems (SMS). It shows the degradation in perfor-
mance when the high intensity of attack continues for long period of time
on the SMS. For comparing the performance of each SMS one round of BF
attack was perform on a machine using a list of passwords. Guess Who [3]
performed more than 8000 passwords attempts on one victim machine. The
red line in figure 13 shows the number of attempts made by the attacker on
the victim machine. To detect this attack three SMS namely GSOC, DSOC
and OSSIM are placed in parallel. The detection rate of GSOC remains sta-
ble throughout the attack. The detection rate of DSOC remains stable until
35 minutes but after that it starts degrading its performance. The detection
rate of OSSIM remains stable until 20 minutes but after that it also starts
degrading its performance. Both the DSOC and OSSIM detects the attacks
but when the attack continues for long period of time there performance
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become bad to worse. This performance degradation is very crucial if the
attacker gets success in its attacks. Due to this reason the alerts are reported
with the delay and the delay continue to increase as shown in the graph. In
this case even the DSOC and OSSIM will detect attack after a certain delay
but this delay give a fair chance to the attacker to do some harmful activities
successfully. Whereas in the case of GSOC it continue detecting the attacks
with a negligible delay.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Grid computing networks are complex environments to protect as they
raise multiple challenges, one of them being the heterogeneous structure of
a grid network which can be composed of different administrative domains.
This heterogeneity lowers the possibility of alert sharing and therefore de-
creases the protection of the network when dealing with cross-domain attacks.
In this paper, we have proposed GSOC which fulfills all the prerequisites for
becoming a prototype security solution for grid computing networks. The
distributed and modular architecture of GSOC allows it to scale up to the
size of the grid computing network. The experiments have shown a network
administrator of any AD can share its security alerts at any time with others.
In case of a severe distributed attack GSOC can give a global view of the
network security after 4 minutes while other tools have failed to do so. The
classification of the ADs in security levels using security evaluation creates a
trust between the members of the grid network. Alert sharing mechanisms
can still be improved. Depending on the security policy, on the critical-
ity level of the alerts and on the security level of the AD, a customizable
anonymity of alerts based on [34, 35] could be used in order to be able to
share even the most critical alerts and therefore improving the correlation.
In cloud computing networks the most recent issues are discussed by Bal-
duzzi et al. [36]. They performed vulnerability tests on 5000 virtual machine
images available in four different data centers of Amazon [37] and reported
several security issues in public virtual images. Bugiel et al. [38] also raised
the similar issues but they performed experiments on 1255 Amazon images
and the scope of their experiments was limited in covering security issues.
Garfinkel and Rosenblum [39] highlighted the use of third party virtual im-
ages and their security issues. Glott et al. [40] discussed the security issues
that occurs when the virtual images are shared within multiple users in cloud
infrastructure. Bleikertz at al. [41] used graph theory techniques to deploy
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secure virtual machine images in Amazon EC2 infrastructure. The main
focus of all the researchers is to emphasis that there exists some serious se-
curity threats in cloud computing infrastructures. GSOC can be deployed in
cloud computing infrastructure after certain modifications and can address
these issues up to certain extend. New boxes should be introduced at each
service, that means one box for infrastructure, one for platform and one for
software. These boxes must be programmed to handle the specific security
issues occurred at each service level and verify newly added and modified
images by the cloud users. If found a vulnerability in any image, they must
block that image for other users. These boxes must works separately and
report to the LA, but if needed can also collaborate to detect the attacks
which are launched using all the three service levels. For every service there
can be a separate LA. All the LAs at each service level must report to the GA
which will handle the security of the entire cloud. Multiple SVOBoxes can
be used if the cloud network is composed of hybrid or multi-public clouds.
The manager of all the boxes will be the Cloud Box (CLBox).
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